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Abstract—With the sustained deployment of distributed gen-
eration capacities and the more proactive role of consumers,
power systems and their operation are drifting away from a
conventional top-down hierarchical structure. Electricity market
structures, however, have not yet embraced that evolution.
Respecting the high-dimensional, distributed and dynamic nature
of modern power systems would translate to designing peer-
to-peer markets or, at least, to using such an underlying de-
centralized structure to enable a bottom-up approach to future
electricity markets. A peer-to-peer market structure based on
a Multi-Bilateral Economic Dispatch (MBED) formulation is
introduced, allowing for multi-bilateral trading with product
differentiation, for instance based on consumer preferences. A
Relaxed Consensus+Innovation (RCI) approach is described to
solve the MBED in fully decentralized manner. A set of realistic
case studies and their analysis allow us showing that such peer-
to-peer market structures can effectively yield market outcomes
that are different from centralized market structures and optimal
in terms of respecting consumers preferences while maximizing
social welfare. Additionally, the RCI solving approach allows for
a fully decentralized market clearing which converges with a
negligible optimality gap, with a limited amount of information
being shared.
Index Terms—Peer-to-peer, electricity markets, renewable en-
ergy integration, distributed optimization, product differentiation
I. INTRODUCTION
GROWING climate and environmental concerns haveled to a rapid increase of the contribution of renew-
able energy capacities in electricity generation. These non-
dispatchable generators, most often decentralized, put stress
on grid operation. In parallel technological advances in data
acquisition (smart meters), communication and management
have rendered smart housing technologies and internet of
things (IoT) possible. Combined with increased storage ca-
pabilities (electric vehicles, residential batteries, heat storage,
etc.), they allow consumers to be more flexible. Overall the
vertical structure of the system is evolving towards a flatter
structure where flexibility and controllability ought to partially
shift from generation to consumption. However, alternative
approaches and related business models necessary to fully
engage the consumption side are not clear yet. Common
solutions to harness consumer flexibility, such as aggregators,
microgrid management or virtual power plants [1], [2], have
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in common that the consumers keep a passive role within
the power system. A relevant alternative would be to give
consumers, prosumers and more generally all actors of the
power system a more proactive role that would eventually
turn more beneficial for all. However, this requires profoundly
rethinking electricity market design in a more consumer-
centric manner, as for instance based on the recently proposed
concept of federated power plants [3]. An extensive review of
the state of the art for consumer-centric electricity markets is
available in [6].
Different structures for consumer-centric markets are dis-
cussed in [4], from pool-based structures implemented at the
micro-grid level [5] to full peer-to-peer approaches. These
structures also differ in the degree of centralization in the
implementation, depending on whether or not there is a
need for a supervisory agent [5], [7]. Further than going
towards more decentralized approaches, made feasible through
distributed and consensus-based optimization, it is of utmost
importance to propose a market framework allowing all agents
to express their preferences. While electricity is commonly
seen as an homogeneous good, most often priced under
uniform pricing in forward markets, expressing preferences
should yield product differentiation [8] (also referred to as
multi-attribute trading [9]) and hence price differentiation. It
is believed that proposing and deploying such novel market
structures is a cornerstone for behavioural change of electricity
consumers [10]. Consequently, our main contribution here is
to describe a peer-to-peer market structure, with a completely
decentralized implementation, allowing for product and price
differentiation. The underlying dispatch model is coined Multi-
Bilateral Economic Dispatch (MBED). A salient feature of the
MBED formulation is that it relies on reciprocity constraints
for each and every trade to be performed among all agents.
Each of these reciprocity constraints may yield a different
price for the corresponding electricity exchange.
Product (and related price) differentiation is a general con-
cept that allows to place a dynamic value on other aspects of
electricity than energy content only. It can be used for instance
for an implementation of grid tariffs, for a dynamic tax system,
for consumers to express their preferences for some types of
generation, and to reflect social aspects. In practice, product
differentiation is already possible through bilateral contracts
or Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) for big consumers
and producers, as well as certificates of origins. However,
retailers begin to offer product differentiation to household
consumers by gathering differentiated needs (mostly for re-
newable generation) and negotiating bilateral contracts. The
approach of the MBED differs from those in the sense that
product differentiation is built in the negotiation mechanism
ar
X
iv
:1
80
4.
03
52
1v
2 
 [c
s.S
Y]
  2
2 S
ep
 20
18
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. X, NO. X 2
itself. This thus makes that all agents of the power system
may account for preferences, different valuations of electricity,
differentiated network charges, etc. through the negotiation
process leading to the dispatch and pricing of electricity.
To truly obtain a decentralized peer-to-peer market, involv-
ing direct interaction and negotiation among all agents of
the system, it is proposed to solve the MBED model using
consensus-based optimization. Such a decentralized imple-
mentation offers benefits such as transparency, data privacy,
access to local and updated data and the absence of a central
supervisory node. All of those features are expected to help
increasing consumer involvement. Our distributed optimization
solution approach to the MBED is referred to as the Relaxed
Consensus+Innovation method (RCI) since building on the
Consensus + Innovation method [11], [12]. It is however
adapted to multi-bilateral trading by enforcing boundary con-
straints through Lagrangian relaxation [13].
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows.
Section II introduces the general framework for peer-to-peer
electricity markets and product differentiation, yielding a gen-
eral formulation of the MBED problem. Section III describes
the RCI method for solving the MBED in a decentralized
manner. The workings and benefits of our proposal for a
peer-to-peer market combined with a solution approach are
illustrated and analyzed in Section IV based a test case of
limited size, though realistic. Conclusions and perspectives for
future work are gathered in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let us consider a system with a set Ω of N agents that are
defined as either producers or consumers. The market structure
proposed in the following is for a forward market, i.e., to be
seen as a resource allocation problem to dispatch and price
supply and demand of electric energy. As such, and in line with
forward mechanisms, this proposal does not account for (nei-
ther accommodates) power system reliability considerations.
As for any forward market, it ought to be complemented by
mechanisms for reserving and activating ancillary services, as
well as by a real-time balancing mechanism which would act
as a penalizing instrument for those not being truthful at the
forward stage.
A. Peer-to-peer Trading
A peer-to-peer architecture for electricity markets is best
defined when comparing it to existing pool-based markets
(see Figure 1, representing the market communication archi-
tecture). A peer-to-peer market, characterized by the lack of
a supervisory agent, consists of a simultaneous negotiation
over the price and energy of multi-bilateral trades along a
predefined trading scheme. As such, peer-to-peer structures
offer a transparent clearing mechanism that involves prosumers
directly while respecting data privacy and being resistant to the
failure of any agent. The trading scheme and its underlying
graph have a big impact on the complexity and efficiency
of the market. Results from graph theory could thus be
applied here. For simplicity, only full peer-to-peer markets
are considered here, i.e., with a complete graph as in Figure
1(b). This graph is for the communication among agents since,
in a peer-to-peer market, it is assumed that in principle any
agent should be able to negotiate with any other agent. These
are market constructs only, regardless of the actual power
network (being, e.g., transmission and distribution grids, or
possibly a microgrid), similarly to pool-based structures for
forward markets, for which actual network constraints and
considerations are considered at the balancing stage only.
Therefore, when using the term “neighbor" in the following,
this does not necessarily relate to physical location, but to a
direct connection on the market communication graph.
Fig. 1. Pool-based (a) and peer-to-peer (b) market structures
To model this trading scheme, the net power injection Pn
of each agent n ∈ Ω is split into a sum of bilaterally traded
quantities with a set of neighboring agents m ∈ ωn, i.e,
Pn =
∑
m∈ωn
Pnm (1)
A positive value corresponds to a sale/production and a
negative value to a purchase/consumption. The set {Pnm |
n ∈ Ω,m ∈ ωn} is the set of decision variables. To lighten
notations Pn is also used for the whole set of transactions of
agent n.
The power set-points of an agent n are constrained by the
power boundaries Pn and Pn,
Pn ≤ Pn ≤ Pn (2)
The role of each agent is restrained to either producer or
consumer (PnPn ≥ 0) as it simplifies the following deriva-
tions. Hence, the decision variables are constrained in sign
depending on whether the agent n is a producer (Pnm ≥ 0)
or a consumer (Pnm ≤ 0). However, the approach may be
extended to the more general case of prosumers by splitting
their buyer (-) and seller (+) role each acting as distinct
negotiating entities (although bound by internal constraints)
through
Pnm = P
+
nm + P
−
nm (3)
Often, consideration of decentralized resource allocation
mechanisms such as our peer-to-peer proposal for electric
energy exchange, triggers concerns regarding trust between
agents. Such trust concerns maybe related to truthfulness,
strategic and malicious behaviour, plus possibly hacking of the
negotiation mechanism. Truthfulness may be handled through
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mechanism design, with the support of a real-time balancing
mechanism yielding penalties for those not being truthful at
the forward stage. Strategic and malicious behaviour would be
similar to the case of current centralized mechanisms, where
some agents may attempt to game the market. Similarly for
hacking, being centralized or peer-to-peer, such algorithms and
software for negotiation and resource allocation may require
a layer of protection from cyber-attacks and the likes.
B. Product Differentiation
The cost function of each agent n is composed of a
production cost (or willingness to pay) and a bilateral trading
cost. In order to simplify the formulation and understanding of
the RCI process, we model the production cost and consumer
utility functions as quadratic functions of the power set-point,
using three positive parameters an, bn and dn,
Cn(Pn) =
1
2
anP
2
n + bnPn + dn, an, bn, dn ≥ 0 (4)
The reader is referred to [5] for more insights into the
geometry of the cost function (4). It should be noted that
it is fairly common to model such cost and utility functions
in a quadratic form, which are seen as realistic for a large
class of conventional generators, and certainly some of the
best assumption to make when having limited insight in actual
utility functions of small consumers and prosumers. However,
as long as these functions are convex and with a bijective
gradient for the MBED model and the RCI process to be well
defined, the overall approach and algorithms described in the
present paper are readily applicable. The determination of cost
functions, and more generally offering strategies, for all those
agents engaging in multi-bilateral trading, is similar to the
case of centralized pool structures, for which substantial liter-
ature already exists. We expect that the proposal of offering
strategies and analysis of strategic behaviour in peer-to-peer
electricity markets will be an active topic of investigation in
the near future.
The bilateral trading cost is calculated as a linear function
of the quantity traded with each neighboring agent,
C˜n(pn) =
∑
m∈ωn
cnmPnm (5)
where pn is the vector of decision variables of agent n
pn = (Pnm)m∈ωn and cnm is the bilateral trading coefficient
imposed by agent n on his trade with agent m.
The total cost C of the system can thus be expressed as
C =
∑
n∈Ω
Cn(Pn) + C˜n(pn) (6)
The bilateral trading coefficient cnm is expressed in this
paper for the purpose of product differentiation and consumer
involvement. All trades can be described with a set G of cri-
teria. The objective valuation of a trade between agents n and
m from the perspective of agent n under the prism of criterion
g is expressed through a positive parameter γgnm (called the
trade characteristic under criterion g ∈ G). Depending on
the criteria, this parameter could be emissions, distance, a
rating based on popular vote or on services provided to the
community, etc. The relative costs born by agent n ∈ Ω of
criterion g is expressed through a parameter cgn called the
criterion value under criterion g. Overall the bilateral trading
coefficient can be expressed through
cnm =
∑
g∈G
cgnγ
g
nm (7)
The framework of product differentiation is general and the
meaning given to the bilateral trading costs depends in their
interpretation. For instance product differentiation can be
pushed centrally for a dynamic and specific tax payment or it
can be used to better describe consumers’ utility through the
expression of their preferences. The former implementation
may account for taxes, regulatory incentives and network
charges, that will then influence the behaviour of market
participants and eventual outcomes of the market. The optimal
design of these incentives and network charges then becomes
a research problem by itself, e.g., to minimize congestion or
to support an optimal usage of renewable energy sources.
The latter implementation relies on the fact that there is a
willingness to pay for certain characteristics of trades for
instance for renewable sources of electricity [14], [15]. In
this case, the choice of the bilateral trading coefficient will be
part of the broader problem of expressing consumers’ utility.
However the strategic aspects of this choice for individual
consumers have been investigated in [16], and were shown
not to cause welfare distortion over time.
Note that the sign of the criterion value will have an impact
on the role of the product differentiation as a rewarding factor
or a penalizing factor. Furthermore, to be consistent with a
linear implementation of product differentiation, the criterion
value should be of opposite signs for sellers and buyers. For
instance when modeling prosumers, opposite criterion values
should be applied to the split buyer and seller role.
C. MBED Formulation
The equilibrium between production and consumption is
represented by a unique balance constraint in a classic pool-
based model. It is here replaced by a set of reciprocity
constraints defined for all agents n ∈ Ω and m ∈ ωn,
Pnm + Pmn = 0 (8)
The Multi-Bilateral Economic Dispatch optimization problem
has for objective to maximize the social welfare of the
community of agents (9a) under the constraints of each agent’s
power injection limits (9b) and sign constraints (9d)-(9e) as
well as the reciprocity constraints (9c). This reads
min
D
∑
n∈Ω
(
Cn(Pn) + C˜n(pn)
)
(9a)
s.t. Pn ≤ Pn ≤ Pn ∀n ∈ Ω (9b)
Pnm + Pmn = 0 ∀(n,m) ∈ (Ω, ωn) (9c)
Pnm ≥ 0 ∀(n,m) ∈ (Ωp, ωn)
(9d)
Pnm ≤ 0 ∀(n,m) ∈ (Ωc, ωn) (9e)
where D = (pn ∈ R|ωn|)n∈Ω. Ωp and Ωc are the sets of
producers and consumers, respectively.
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The shadow prices of the reciprocity constraints (9c), de-
noted λnm, define the prices for the various trades. This im-
plies that all trades can be made at different prices. Differences
in price are mostly induced by product differentiation, but can
also result from an incomplete trading graph through different
price zones. Since the MBED is a convex optimization prob-
lem, it only admits a single optimum, which can be obtained by
applying a wealth of centralized and distributed optimization
methods.
The simple structure of the MBED described in the above
is in line with the type of electricity pools considered for
forward markets in Europe, where network constraints are
not readily considered (except for cross-zonal transmission
limitations), as well as other power system operation aspects
related to e.g. voltage levels, reactive power, etc. However, this
dispatch may readily be generalized to the network constrained
case, while potentially adding security constraints and other
power system operation aspects. Considering a DC network-
constrained optimal power flow for that dispatch, the nature
and properties of the resulting optimization problem will stay
the same. Thus, this allows to find an optimal dispatch that
is also the true global optimum, while yielding well-defined
prices that support the dispatch. Finally, the RCI solution
approach described hereafter is readily applicable, since such
DC optimal power flow problems are separable and can be
solved by a wealth of distributed and decentralized optimiza-
tion techniques [17]. Considering an AC network-constrained
optimal power flow dispatch would be more difficult though,
since modifying the desirable properties of the MBED problem
formulation in (9).
We concentrate here on a single-time-step formulation, in
order to cover the basics of our peer-to-peer market structure
based on the MBED formulation and product differentiation.
However, it may be extended to a multi-time-step formulation
to account for, e.g., commitment and ramping constraints
and storage characteristics. This may be done by defining
and using more complex market products (instead of the
single quantity-price products considered here), though at the
expense of complexity of the resulting optimization problem
and of the properties of the market if the resulting optimiza-
tion problem becomes non-convex. Alternatively, the MBED
could readily account for these temporally binding constraints
explicitly, in a way similar to [5]. An exemple generalized
formulation of the MBED problem for multiple time steps
and temporally-binding constraints is available in [16].
The MBED model allows for an economic dispatch that re-
spects revenue adequacy, and that allows market participant to
be budget balanced. The MBED model is separable along each
market participant. Indeed, the agents are bound by the trading
reciprocity constraints only, as the quadratic terms of the
objective function are independent. Additionally, as Slater’s
condition is verified, strong duality holds. This opens the way
for a decentralized implementation of the MBED using duality.
This means that in practice, through the decentralized solution
approach described in the following, all involved agents focus
only on solving their own local profit maximization (or cost
minimization) problem, regardless of overall social welfare. It
is by construction, and only by construction, that we know that
each agent concentrating on solving their own local problem
will yield maximum social welfare solution at convergence. In
other words, there is no structural gap between the solutions
of the centralized and decentralized approaches to solving
the MBED problem, and hence no price to pay for reaching
consensus over obtaining the most efficient market outcome.
III. THE RELAXED CONSENSUS + INNOVATION SOLUTION
APPROACH
The Relaxed Consensus + Innovation (RCI) is a decen-
tralized optimization method inspired by the Consensus +
Innovation method presented for instance in [5] in the case of
a pool-based market. In the remainder, iterations are indexed
with k.
A. Structure of the Method
The RCI method resembles a dual ascent method as pre-
sented for instance in [18]. The global optimization problem
is split into small local problems, the optima of which are
reached to obtain the solution of the global problem. Each
markets participants aims at solving his own local problem
while reacting on the primal and dual estimates of others.
The RCI methods is built in such a way that when all local
optimum are reached, the equilibrium point is a feasible
solution of the global problem which satisfies the first order
Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions (KKT) and is as such an
optimum of the global problem.
The local optimization problem of a given agent n ∈ Ω at
a given iteration k is
min
Dn
Cn(Pn) + C˜n(pn)− p>nλkn (10a)
s.t. Pn ≤ Pn ≤ Pn (10b)
Pnm ≥ 0 ∀m ∈ ωn if n ∈ Ωp
(10c)
Pnm ≤ 0 ∀m ∈ ωn if n ∈ Ωc
(10d)
where λkn = (λ
k
nm)m∈ωn is the vector of price estimates of
agent n at iteration k, p>n is the transposed vector of pn
and Dn = (pn ∈ R|ωn|). In contrast with to the dual ascent
method, the local optimization problem is not solved directly
as this may affect the solving of the MBED problem. First
of all, solving of the local problem can be computationally
costly due to the high number of decision variables per agent.
A solution can be to replace that complete solving step with a
gradient step and a projection on the feasibility set [5], [19].
Additionally, a direct approach to solve local sub-problems in
the MBED will most often results in binary outcomes: when
offered different prices, an agent will always try to trade as
much as possible from the neighboring agent with the most
interesting price and nothing from the others. This results in
an undampened oscillating system.
Our approach is to apply a gradient step. The sign con-
straints are enforced at each iteration through a closest point
projection. Besides, the power boundary constraints are en-
forced through a Lagrangian relaxation as proposed in [18]
instead of the closest point projection of the C+I method.
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Initialize λ0n, p
0
n
λ-update
λk+1n : (11)
µ-update
µn
k+1: (12)
µn
k+1: (13)
P-update
pk+1n : (19)
Exchange of
information
F k+1nm : (23)
Stopping criteria
(24)-(26)
Market clearing
yes
k := k + 1
no
Fig. 2. Flow chart of the Relaxed Consensus + Innovation algorithm
Using the latter may yield optimality gaps if used for the
MBED problem. The corresponding dual variables µn and µn
are estimated using complementary slackness.
An iteration of the Relaxed Consensus + Innovation method
can be split into three steps. The first two steps consist in up-
dating the dual variables of the trading reciprocity constraints
and of the power boundary constraints (III-B). The third step
consists in updating the decision variables based on a gradient
step built on optimality conditions of the local optimality
problem (III-C). Some operational aspects are presented in
III-D. The structure of the algorithm is summed up in Figure
2.
B. Dual Updates
Compared to the dual decomposition of [18], the algorithm
is here implemented in a fully decentralized setup. The con-
sequence is that price estimates for a given trade are also
calculated individually by each participant, even though after
convergence, a consensus has to be reached on these estimates
(i.e., λnm = λmn). This convergence of price estimates is
ensured in the price update, (11), through a consensus term.
The last term, the innovation term, ensures the enforcement
of the equality constraint (as in the dual ascent method). This
is referred to as the λ-update,
λk+1nm = λ
k
nm − βk
(
λknm − λkmn
)− αk (P knm + P kmn) (11)
where αk and βk are sequences of positive factors such that
any excitation is persistent, so that the series of each sequence
diverges [12]. The tuning of these parameters is key to the
performance of the algorithm and will usually be a trade-off
between convergence speed and resilience to change of setup.
The tuning relies as much on the value of the parameters as on
the ratio between the two. The performance could be improved
by using adaptive factors that adjust this ratio.
The dual variable of the boundary constraints are updated
similarly taking into account complementary slackness. This
is called the µ-update,
µn
k+1 = max(0, µn
k + ηk(Pn − Pn)) (12)
µn
k+1 = max(0, µn
k + ηk(Pn − Pn)) (13)
where ηk is a persistent sequence of positive tuning factors.
C. Primal Updates
The updates of the decision variables of agent n are based
on the KKT optimality conditions of the local optimization
problem. The relaxed Lagrangian function of the local op-
timization problem at iteration k presented in (10) can be
expressed as
Llocn (pn,λ
k
n, µn, µn) = Cn(pn) + C˜n(pn)− p>nλkn
+ µn(Pn − Pn)− µn(Pn − Pn)
(14)
With this definition, the first order optimality conditions of
the relaxed problem, given by the KKT conditions, are for all
agents n ∈ Ω and m ∈ ωn
anPn + bn + cnm − λnm + µn − µn = 0 (15)
For any trade between two agents n and m, we define a new
price, referred to as the perceived price, through
λˆnm = λnm − cnm (16)
By opposition, the trading reciprocity constraint dual variables
(λnm) are referred to as trading prices. As an example, in a
tax implementation of product differentiation, the perceived
price corresponds to the price after tax, while trading prices
correspond to the price before tax. The optimality conditions
of the relaxed problem (defined for every decision variable
Pnm n ∈ Ω,m ∈ ωn) becomes
anPn + bn − λˆnm + µn − µn = 0 (17)
These conditions are equivalent to the optimality condition of
a non-zero trade between any two agents n ∈ Ω and m ∈ ωn
(i.e., when the sign constraint are not binding). Consequently,
the perceived prices of a given agent are uniform on the subset
of effective trades (trades with Pnm 6= 0 called non-zero
trades) to a value that equates the marginal cost of production
(utility of consumption).
The Lagrangian of the relaxed problem has bijective gradi-
ent when seen as function of the power setpoints. For each
negotiated trade (between agent n and m, a target power
setpoint can be define using the inverse gradient, i.e.
P (m),k+1n =
λˆnm − µn + µn − bn
an
(18)
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. X, NO. X 6
The primal variables are then updated following (19), re-
ferred to as P-update (here for a producer),
P k+1nm = max
(
0, P knm + f
k
nm
(
P (m),k+1n − P kn
))
(19)
where fnm is an asymptotically proportional factor defined as
fknm =
|Pnm|+ δk∑
l∈ωn(|Pnl|+ δk)
(20)
with δk a positive and persistent sequence. The max operator
in (19) is used to enforce the sign constraint of the decision
variables and is replaced in the case of a consumer by a min
operator.
Overall, the primal estimates update verifies an averaged
optimality condition (if the sign projection is omitted),∑
m∈ωn
P k+1nm =
Λˆk+1n − µnk+1 + µnk+1 − bn
an
(21)
where Λˆk+1n is an average of the prices perceived by agent n
weighted by the factors fknm,
Λˆk+1n =
∑
m∈ωn
fknmλˆ
k+1
nm (22)
As the perceived prices are uniform on the subset of effec-
tive trades and the factor fknm is asymptotically proportional to
the traded power, after convergence, the averaged optimality
condition is equivalent to the optimality condition of the
effective trades.
D. Operational Aspects of the Iterative Process
The RCI is a distributed algorithm meant to be implemented
in a decentralized fashion, i.e., where all the updates above are
done locally by each agent. Consensus-based algorithms like
this one are commonly praised for their ability to respect users’
privacy and support data security since very little information
is shared and only with those agents engaged in multi-bilateral
negotiations. All data and related computation are handled
locally by each agent. It is unclear whether approaches like
inverse optimization or else could allow revealing some of the
hidden data and parameters (e.g., preferences) of the market
participants. This may be the focus of further work, more
generally considering strategic behaviour of agents engaging
in multi-bilateral trading.
Here to perform the RCI updates, a minimum set of in-
formation is to be shared. As such, at each iteration of the
process, the set F knm of information sent by an agent n ∈ Ω
to a neighboring agent m ∈ ωn at iteration k must be the
following:
F knm = {P knm, λknm} (23)
Interestingly, all the agent’s internal production/consumption
parameters (an, bn, Pn, Pn, ...) as well as the criterion pa-
rameters (cgn, γ
g
nm) do not need to be shared in order to
reach optimality. The RCI implementation of MBED creates a
fully decentralized setup with limited exchange of information,
which is a valuable aspect with regards to data privacy.
The iterative process is stopped when the convergence of
the algorithm is established. For that purpose, we define three
positive parameters λ, P and µ such that the algorithm will
terminate when the following conditions are met∣∣λk+1nm − λknm∣∣ < λ (24)∣∣P k+1nm − P knm∣∣ < P (25)∣∣µk+1n − µkn∣∣ < µ (26)
Criterion (26) is optional but can be used for a more precise
monitoring of convergence. Similarly, it is common to use a
dual convergence criterion only, with the understanding that
primal and dual convergence are linked. Further work should
be done to understand if it is also the case here.
The number of decision variables that a given agent n
deals with is equal to the cardinal of ωn. This makes this
cardinal critical for the complexity of the model and of the
algorithm. A full peer-to-peer communication scheme will give
a number of variables of the order N2, which renders this
model hard to scale up as it is. The topic of scalability, open
for future work, will probably be linked to a sparsification of
the communication matrix with example structures proposed in
[4] such as a multi-level peer-to-peer (a russian-doll structure)
or an hybrid peer-to-peer–pool-based structure.
IV. APPLICATION AND CASE STUDIES
The RCI solving approach to the MBED is evaluated
based on simplified though realistic setup as proof-of-concept.
After describing the system setup in Section IV-A, a basic
illustration of the operation of the RCI and the impact of
product differentiation is presented in Section IV-B based on
a single time step, to provide the reader with an intuition
for its workings. Then, the analysis of our proposal peer-
to-peer market is extended to simulation over a full year
period (Sections IV-C and IV-D) to further look at convergence
properties and impact of product differentiation.
A. Simulation Setup
The setup is composed of 12 agents: 6 producers including
two wind turbines, 2 solar PV and 2 fossil generators and 6
consumers including 4 household consumers and 2 industrial
consumers. The sequences of wind and solar PV production
are taken from [20] and [21]. The consumption sequences as
well as the flexibility capacity are derived from [21]. The non
time-varying market participants are taken from [5]. Note that
compared to [5], non-zero lower boundary constraints have
been added for the generators. The capacities of the generators
and consumers are adapted to be comparable. It was chosen to
model the PV and the wind turbines as must-take generators
(Pn = Pn). This allow do define for them a virtual cost
function (an and bn) without affecting the optimal solution.
Another option would be to model them as zero marginal cost
generators (an = bn = 0 and Pn = 0), however it does
not suit the RCI process (non-bijective gradients). The lack
of uniqueness of the solutions of the local problem of these
agents usually renders the RCI slower than a must-take entity.
The agents’ parameter for this setup are summed up in the
Appendix.
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The trades are differentiated through a single criterion
(cnm = cnγnm) that aims at increasing self and local con-
sumption. For that purpose γnm is chosen to be the euclidean
distance between agents n and m. The agents are split into
two buses (see Figure 3), with 3 generators and 3 loads
each. Note that the MBED model can be operated without a
corresponding network layer. In fact market participants could
be connected to completely different part of a nation wide
grid. In this test case, however, it was chosen to implement
a simplified microgrid structure to clarify the model and to
provide quantitative analysis of local consumption.
To take into account the two-bus nature of the setup and the
grid structure, the trade characteristics, γnm between any pair
of agents of opposite buses is set to a fixed value (1 km in
this case) such that every inter-bus trade has the same marginal
trading cost. We set the criterion value to a common value in
absolute with a negative sign for consumers and positive sign
for producers. The setup is simulated over one year with an
Fig. 3. Display of market participants’ geographical layout, split into two
buses
hourly time-step. To improve the performance, a warm start
based on persistence is used, although it is expected that given
the high penetration of renewables and their variability, the
persistence will give a high error over the hourly time-step.
The construction of the RCI algorithm ensures that, given
convergence of the algorithm, the solution found is optimal
even though the convergence and its speed depend on the
tuning parameters αk, βk, δk and ηk. The parameters chosen
after tuning are
αk =
0.01
k0.01
, βk =
0.1
k0.1
, ηk = 0.005, δk = 1 (27)
The stopping criteria are set to
λ = 0.001, P = 0.01, µ = 0.0001 (28)
B. General Behavior
The evolution of the negotiations through the RCI algorithm
are plotted for producer 3 in Figure 4 to show the convergence
behavior. The criterion value is here set to 1 ce.kWh−1.km−1.
Two different time steps are shown, one without a warm start
(t=1) and one with the warm start based on persistence (t=8).
It can be observed that the perceived prices of effective trades
are uniform while the other respect the optimality conditions
(i.e., the sign constraint dual variables are positive).
A single time-step example is also provided in Figure 5 to
analyze the impact of product differentiation on grid usage.
We take here advantage of the two-bus structure to assimilate
Fig. 4. Evolution of energy and perceived prices negotiated by producer 3 at
time step 1 and 8.
grid usage to the use of the inter-bus line. Without product
differentiation (cn = 0), the market behaves as a pool-based
market with a single power balance constraint and a single
price as the trading graph is complete. Consequently, the inter-
bus exchanges are high. However the introduction of product
differentiation based on distances puts higher marginal bilat-
eral trading costs on inter-bus trades than on intra-bus trades.
Consequently, increasing the criterion value has the effect of
shifting inter-bus trades toward intra-bus trades until the two
buses are autonomous (or all flexibility is used) (cn ∈ [0; 2]).
After that, an increase on the criterion value reduces intra-
bus trades, as agents reduce their production/consumption.
It can be noted that this impact of product differentiation
depends highly on the flexibility capacity of the producers
and consumers.
Fig. 5. Impact of the common criterion value on the inter-bus exchanges
during one time step.
C. Convergence Analysis
To certify the optimality of the solution found, a centralized
implementation of the MBED was also conducted using a
quadratic program solver in Matlab. Both results are compared
in terms of objective functions. Note that there is no interest
in comparing solutions in terms of decision variable output, as
the error on that output will depend on how flat the objective
function is around the optimal solution. As the RCI method
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is based on gradient steps, an optimality gap approach makes
more sense.
The common criterion value is set to 1 ce.kWh−1.km−1.
The quality and pace of convergence for a single time-step
(t=1) can be seen in Figure 6 through the evolution (without
stopping criteria) of optimality gap compared to the optimal
solution given by the LP implementation. For an assessment
of the feasibility of the solution provided by the RCI, the error
on consensus on primal and dual estimates is also displayed.
The RCI algorithm presents a logarithmic increase of accuracy
of the objective function that is gained in a first phase by
approximating the correct solution (here the first 600 itera-
tions) and in a second phase by increasing the accuracy of the
solution found. It has to be noted that the performance could
be further improved for instance by using adaptive parameters.
The convergence speed (mostly for the second phase) can also
be significantly improved by increasing the tuning parameters
likely at the expense of a more oscillating system which is also
less resilient to setup changes. Furthermore an efficient warm
start can effectively reduce the first phase. It has been chosen
here to use slowly decaying α and β parameters, to maintain a
high convergence speed and a good resilience, although non-
decaying parameters can lead to a faster convergence.
The distribution over 1 year of the number of iterations
needed to reach the stopping criteria as well as the distribution
of the relative error on objective value compared to the
LP solution are shown in Figure 7 with relative cumulative
optimality gap of 0.03%, a maximum relative optimality gap
of 4.2% and an average number of iteration to convergence of
298, while the average time to reach the stopping criteria is
0.1s using 64-bit MATLAB R2017a and on an Intel core I7
6500U, 2.5GHz, 8GB RAM.
Fig. 6. Evolution of the optimality gap and the consensus error throughout
the RCI process
Employing consensus-based optimization approaches nec-
essarily increases algorithmic complexity and related com-
putational burden if compared to the corresponding central-
ized solving approach. Scaling to a large number of agents
may then become challenging. For an extensive analysis of
the properties of the proposed market and related solution
approach, as well as a comparison with other proposals for
Fig. 7. Histogram of the relative error on objective value (a) and the number
of iterations to reach convergence (b)
consumer-centric electricity markets, the reader is referred
to [22] which looks at 3 types of markets (peer-to-peer,
community-based and hybrid) with several hundred agents
based on a High-Performance Computing (HPC) implemen-
tation.
D. Impact of Product Differentiation
Two points of view can be used when analyzing the impact
of product differentiation in the MBED: the consumer point
of view or the system point of view. In the first case, we
acknowledge the willingness of market participants to pay for
some characteristics of the electricity they trade, and its link
to their utility function. We then study this impact in term of
social welfare – with the objective function as defined in (9a)
– compared to a pool-based market that does not allow for
product differentiation. A thorough study of this case would
require a deeper analysis of consumer’s willingness to pay and
it’s link to the utility of consuming electricity. In the second
case, the product differentiation is introduced as a mean to deal
with externalities imposed on power systems (environmental
aspects, grid costs...). The differentiation has to be designed to
take into account these externalities and we study how product
differentiation can effectively reduce them and at which cost.
The second case is implemented here. With product differ-
entiation implemented through a distance criteria, the exter-
nality targeted is the grid costs. The topic of this paper is not
to ensure that the euclidean distance is a proper description of
the marginal impact of a bilateral trade on grid usage nor to
describe how grid cost are related to grid usage (in the real-
time use or as signal for investments), but rather to show how
the use of product differentiation can affect some exogenous
parameters that describe externalities or in this case grid usage.
Also it is made here the simplifying assumption that grid-
usage-related externalities can be effectively described by the
energy and the maximal power that transits through the grid.
In our two-bus system, the exogenous parameters studied are
the energy and maximum power that transits through the line
between the two buses as a result of the economic dispatch.
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In Figure 8 (left), it can be seen how the use of product
differentiation based on distances reduces the energy and the
maximum power that flows through the inter-bus line over
a year compared to a case without product differentiation
(equivalent to a pool-based model). A criterion value of 1
ce.kWh−1.km−1 allows to reduce energy flows by more than
95% and the maximum power by more than 40%.
In the MBED formulation this reduction of externalities
is made at the expense of increased cost of production and
consumption (
∑
n∈Ω Cn(Pn)) called in the rest direct costs.
The impact of the criterion value on direct costs is shown in
Figure 8 (right) while the relation between reduction of energy
and power flows and cost increase is shown in Figure 9 (left).
it shows that in this setup, almost 50% of energy flow decrease
can be achieved with very low direct cost increase (less than
0.01%) while 30% of the power peak and more than 90% of
energy flows can be reduced with less than 2% direct cost
increase.
From the perspective of the RCI, this reduction in inter-bus
trades can also be translated into a reduction of the average
number of potential partners which overall can be seen in the
decrease of the average number of iteration when the criterion
value increases in Figure 9 (right). Additionally it seems that
the iteration number increases very rapidly as the criterion
value gets close to zero. This is inherent to the structure of
the MBED model: with no product differentiation, the MBED
model is equivalent to a pool-based market (given that the
communication scheme is complete) whose optimal solution
depends only on the total productions/consumptions not on the
bilateral trades. It means that in this case the MBED model
has multiple solutions which prevents the RCI from finding
a solution quickly. The consequence being that, in the case
of several market participants not valuing trading costs, the
MBED model should be adapted to a hybrid multi-bilateral
and pool-based economic dispatch to improve efficiency. The
pertinence of these results should be strengthen by a sensitivity
analysis for instance on the flexibility capacity of consumers
or on the penetration of renewable as well as on the number
of buses and market participant.
Fig. 8. Impact of a common criterion value on the line-use (left) and on costs
increase of the MBED (right)
Fig. 9. Link between the line-use decrease and the cost increase with the use
of product differentiation (left) and the impact of a common criterion value
on the iterations to convergence of the RCI (right)
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
Acknowledging increasing available flexibility of consumers
and prosumers, as well as the increasingly decentralized nature
of power generation, we have proposed a structure for peer-to-
peer electricity markets, based on multi-bilateral trading and
product differentiation. We showed that the MBED market
framework can be easily and efficiently implemented without
the need of a central agent through a distributed Relaxed
Consensus+Innovation approach with only a limited exchange
of information. This RCI implementation was shown to solve
the MBED problem with acceptable optimality gap.
Within our MBED-based framework, product differentiation
proved to affect power exchanges in a meaningful way. This
framework offers a large variety of implementation. Our
proposal decentralized implementation based on consumer
preferences is promising in the way that it allows for more pro-
active consumer behavior e.g. by favoring local generation or
clean generation. Future work regarding product differentiation
will focus on the impact of consumer behavior in such a
framework. Topic such as heterogeneous criterion values,
strategic behavior or impact of free riders will be investigated.
The scalability of peer-to-peer markets is generally computa-
tionally challenging. One direction for better scalability is the
reduction of the number of communication. Its impact of this
communication on optimality and convergence speed should
be assessed, to eventually study the possibility of communica-
tion schemes such as multi-level peer-to-peer markets, as well
as hybrid peer-to-peer and pool-based structures.
When it comes to the RCI solution approach to the
MBED optimization problem, future work will concentrate
on implementing more constrained economic dispatch models.
These could either be treated by estimating dual variables
through the negotiation process, or by performing a closest-
point projection as with the injection bounds in this paper’s
implementation. Besides, the MBED problem with product
differentiation may allow to readily account for network
charges, defined in either endogenous or exogenous manner,
which will readily affect multi-bilateral negotiation to account
for network topology, see e.g. [23]. Eventually, the MBED
approach shall be generalized so as to account for congestion,
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reactive power compensation, losses, etc. The sharing of these
costs in the context of communities is subject to social
contracts as investigated in [7]. However the interest of P2P
schemes will be to readily attribute costs directly induced by
the various trades and agents involved, instead of socializing
those costs as is most often done in a pool-based market
framework.
The peer-to-peer market setup proposed here is for a forward
mechanism, hence overlooking some of the salient aspects
of today’s evolution of power systems and electricity mar-
kets, i.e., related to increasing variability and uncertainty due
to penetration of renewable generation, changes in demand
behaviour, etc. Such issues are not inherent to peer-to-peer
electricity markets but instead a general problem to be dealt
with in any market setup. In principle, forward markets such as
those presented in this paper are not there to account for these
aspects. These are dealt with through short-term capacity (i.e.,
reserve) markets and eventual balancing markets. It is so far
unclear whether those other mechanisms should be adapted
to the case of peer-to-peer electricity markets. This should
be the focus of future work, e.g., concentrating on risk and
information sharing, financial products for risk hedging, as
well as distributed mechanisms for reserve provision.
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APPENDIX
A. Simulation Setup
Tables I and II gather the market participants’ utility func-
tions employed. (P tw) and (P
t
s ) are the normalized series of
respectively wind and solar power generation, while P±,th
are the household consumption series with use of upward
(+) or downward (-) flexibility, respectively. The wind series
are taken from [20] with a installed capacity scalled down
to 100 kW per wind turbine. The solar and consumption
series are taken from [21] with a installed capacity scalled
down to 50 kW per solar installation. The flexibility range is
deduced from the controlled generation of [21] while the cost
of this flexibility as well as the non-time-varying agents and
the virtual cost functions of renewable sources of electricity
are deduced from [5]. For a more realistic setup, more effort
should be put on a description of flexible generation and its
costs settings.
B. Proof of Strong Duality
In Section II-C, it is stated that Slater’s condition is verified,
and from that is deduced that strong duality holds. This
appendix aims at clarifying this statement.
The cost functions are quadratic with a positive quadratic
coefficient. Similarly the constraints are linear thus convex.
This implies that the MBED is a convex optimization process.
The feasibility of the MBED problem depends on the feasibil-
ity of the corresponding pool-based model where the balance
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TABLE I
PARAMETERS OF THE GENERATORS
n Type Bus Pn Pn an bn
[kWh] [kWh] [ cC
kWh2
] [ cC
kWh
]
1 Wind 1 P tw1 P
t
w1 0.05 3
3 Fossil 1 15 105 0.056 3
6 PV 1 P ts1 P
t
s1 0.05 3
9 Wind 2 P tw2 P
t
w2 0.05 3
10 Fossil 2 20 90 0.06 4
12 PV 2 P ts2 P
t
s2 0.05 3
TABLE II
PARAMETERS OF THE LOADS
n Type Bus Pn Pn an bn
[kWh] [kWh] [ cC
kWh2
] [ cC
kWh
]
2 Household 1 -P+,th1 -P
−,t
h1 0.05 3
4 Household 1 -P+,th2 -P
−,t
h2 0.056 3
5 Industrial 1 -120 -6 0.04 8
7 Household 2 -P+,th3 -P
−,t
h3 0.05 3
8 Household 2 -P+,th4 -P
−,t
h4 0.06 4
11 Industrial 2 -120 -10 0.05 8
constraints (equations (9c)) is replaced by a global balance
constraint: ∑
n∈Ω
Pn = 0 (29)
If the market is well designed (meaning if there is adequate
means of production and consumption), the pool-based model
is feasible. This implies that the MBED is feasible. Indeed if
x∗ = (P ∗n , n ∈ Ω) is a feasible solution of the pool-based
problem, then y∗ = (P ∗nm, n ∈ Ω,m ∈ ωn) is a feasible
solution of the MBED problem where y∗ is defined such that:
P ∗nm =
P ∗m∑
l∈Ωc P
∗
l
P ∗n ∀n ∈ Ωp,m ∈ Ωc (30)
P ∗nm = −P ∗mn ∀n ∈ Ωc,m ∈ Ωp (31)
As a convex and feasible optimization problem, Slater’s
condition tells us that strong duality holds.
